IPI World Congress 2016, Doha — Kaius Niemi haastatteli Nina Hruštšovaa

Kaius Niemi:

You received part of your education at Moscow State University in 1987, and graduated in 1998. You are currently a professor at The New School University in Greenwich Village, New York. You are also affiliated with several policy and educational organizations, and have worked at Columbia University as an education expert.

You have also written many books. Your latest book is titled The Lost Khrushchev: A Journey into the Gulag of the Russian Mind. The book tells the story of Leonid Khrushchev, your father, and former Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. The book project began nearly 30 years ago after a chance conversation with Vyacheslav Molotov, Joseph Stalin's foreign minister.

That inspired you to finally document your family's past. In the book, you also address the legacy of your great-grandfather, Nikita Khrushchev, whose leadership from 1953 to 1964 is said to have much bearing on Russian politics today. So part political memoir, part historical investigation, this family chronicle can be described as a window into contemporary Russia.

And we are here today to talk about contemporary Russia. So let's start with the new book. With your very particular professional career and family background, you are very much the right person to describe where Russia is currently heading and what we should look at and scrutinize when reading about Russia and making assumptions about Russia's future.

So welcome, Nina.

Nina Khrushcheva:

Thank you. Thank you for this very generous introduction. People don't live that long, and I've already done all this. Thank you for this.

I want to first thank IPI. I want to thank Project Syndicate. Because of these two organizations, I'm here, and I'm very honored to be here.

Al Jazeera — we in New York very much mourn your departure from New York City, so that's very unfortunate for us. I think it's very difficult for our panel. I mean, I hope we're going to be interesting because after the last panel, I almost questioned why we're here talking about Putin and contemporary Russia. It seems a little trivial after what we heard. But oh well.

So I'm not going to talk about my background, but I do want to talk about Vladimir Putin because even if he does seem trivial — especially after these amazing stories of brave journalism that we heard over the last few days — the triviality expands over eleven time zones. And it's not just the border of Finland.

Despite Barack Obama's reference to Russia as a "regional power," actually it's a regional power that can influence most of the world and, if it wants to — and often does — can do a lot of damage to the world.

So what to look for? Since you asked me what I know because of my background — not more than most people — but I do know that very often the Russian leader always picks a subject that he's an expert in, and Vladimir Putin's subject is history.

So if we want to understand Russia, we have to understand Russian history. I think this is something to look for.

If we try to understand the conflict in Ukraine, we have to look at Catherine the Great and her first expansion into Crimea.

If we look at Syria, we also have to look into Catherine the Great and her adventures there, but also at the Christian roots in various parts of Syria that Russians take very seriously.

So in short, this is an important thing to look for. Of course there's a military-industrial complex, there is a failing economy — which war always helps, either in image-building or in strengthening the military-industrial complex — but I think the historical greatness that Putin puts forward as his major agenda is something very important.

Kaius Niemi:

One thing that is very much a present-day issue is oil. Oil is something that really connects Russia and the Middle East. And being here in Doha, it's interesting to ask: what is Russia's present-day great game in the region? We can see oil prices plummeting, and the Russian economy is having a very hard time.

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, oil is plummeting, in fact, and so it could be part of the great game in the region. But I actually think it's obviously much more than that. All great games are not just about economics. They are, in fact, about being a great power.

For Vladimir Putin, it's also about influence far beyond the "near abroad." Syria particularly is one of the few countries in the Middle East where Putin has influence. So of course that relationship with Bashar al-Assad is very important to him, and he's going to stand by that man until the very last day.

There are, of course, other relationships that Putin has been able to foster — with Egypt and President el-Sisi, and ongoing relationships with Iran. So there are a lot of open doors for Putin.

And of course all these relationships allow him to claim — specifically to the United States — that he's much more than a regional power. That he is a player. For example, the Syrian ceasefire would not have happened without Russian involvement. The peace process is about the United States and Russia foremost.

So that's the great game, because during the 15 years Putin has been in power, the job he believed he had was to bring Russia back to the grown-ups' table, so to speak. And at this point he feels that he has achieved that objective.

Kaius Niemi:

What's going to happen next? What's your prediction for the Middle East and Russia's evolution policy-wise? Is the Middle East more important and interesting for Russia than it used to be? And is that energy-driven or policy-driven?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, anybody who wants to predict anything about Russia is completely doomed, so I'm not going to venture into this. Especially those who studied Kremlinology in the past know that you cannot predict these things.

Nikita Khrushchev was ousted overnight. Mikhail Gorbachev lost power overnight. And no expert in the world actually predicted that the Soviet Union was going to collapse so quickly and so ingloriously.

So no, I'm not going to predict any of this.

However, I think the Middle East is very important to Russia, and Putin has proven that he can be a player there. He has created relationships that could become very beneficial, both politically and economically.

For example, one of the objectives of the Syrian campaign was to showcase new military equipment and the modernized Russian military. And he did this. Apparently there's also a new deal with Iran in the works.

So this is something that can benefit Putin in the future.

On the other hand, we do know from the very quick collapse of the relationship with Turkey that all these relationships being built can also be demolished overnight.

But what is important to remember is that if Putin stays in power, he plans to become more and more of a global voice — much more than he was even five years ago.

Kaius Niemi:

Do you think the Middle East is a region where Russia is being listened to?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, he has proven so. I mean, I don't know whether I think that, but he has certainly proven it.

Once again, if we talk about the ceasefire and the peace process — as fragile as that may be — whether it lasts or not, and whether the war finally comes to some sort of resolution, is still a very big question. It depends on Assad's fate and many other things.

But he is listened to.

I'm sure you remember the G20 summit in Australia, where Putin was treated as an outcast and had to leave early because allegedly he didn't get enough sleep. Then the next summit was in Turkey, and there he was the man of the hour. Everybody wanted to talk to him.

So he is capable of turning relationships around quickly, just as he is capable of ruining them quickly as well.

But I think we can predict that, at least in the near future, he will continue to be listened to.

Kaius Niemi:

And how about the Iranian question? That's obviously very important nowadays when talking about the Middle East and the whole strategic balance in the region. How do you see Russia playing the Iran card?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, as I said, apparently there's a new deal in the works involving military equipment for Iran. Russia has always had relations with Iran, obviously. The nuclear deal with Iran was happening with Russia's assistance.

But I think Russia has stepped up its game quite a bit because Putin, who doesn't want Russia to be seen as merely a regional power and instead wants parity with the United States, saw an opening the moment the United States improved relations with Iran and lifted sanctions.

Putin is now going to step into every opening available.

Another thing — you asked me what I know about the Kremlin more than others. I don't know more than others. But if we look at Putin's personality, he has the personality of a splinter. He sees an opening and goes in.

People are often puzzled: how does he do it? Well, his favorite sport is judo. And in judo, you find the weakness of your opponent and you move in. I think with Iran, and with many other countries, we are witnessing exactly that.

We're seeing the same thing with Cuba. Suddenly Cuba matters to Russia again.

Putin is going to continue this kind of splinter policy.

Kaius Niemi:

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had quite a few allies in the Middle East, and things were more settled ideologically. There were links between Arab socialist states and the Soviet Union, and alliances were perhaps easier than they are today, when things have become much more agile and overnight changes can happen.

Do you see comparisons between that era and the current situation?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, Putin is certainly expanding Russia's influence.

Yes, Russia did have many allies in the Middle East. Iraq was one of them. And I think that's why Putin is fighting so hard for Syria and Assad's position — because he doesn't want to lose that ally. He wants to keep him for as long as possible while also acquiring others along the way.

The withdrawal of Russian troops — or what we are told is a withdrawal — after 167 days is an important point.

When Putin first came into power — I think he was still Boris Yeltsin's prime minister at the time — he spoke about the Soviet war in Afghanistan and said that one of the Soviet Union's greatest mistakes was getting bogged down there.

And I think that's why, despite Barack Obama's prediction that Russia would get bogged down in Syria, Putin technically withdrew. We don't know whether he really did or whether troops will later return, but at least he tries not to repeat those mistakes.

So Russia is going to remain involved in the Middle East. I think Putin will continue expanding influence there, but in a much more tactically agile and nimble way than the Soviet Union ever did.

Kaius Niemi:

And coming back a little to the oil question — it's no longer as easy as it once was for OPEC to shift prices. Obviously Russia is interested in raising oil prices together with OPEC countries.

How crucial is that for getting the Russian economy running again?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Oh, absolutely crucial. But the question is how much influence Russia actually has.

If you read the Russian press and listen to pronouncements from parliament, you would know that many people there describe falling oil prices as an American conspiracy. So supposedly that is what Russia has to fight first.

Yes, it matters enormously. The economy contracted almost four percent last year, which is a huge contraction.

But unless Putin courts Saudi Arabia and other countries and makes some kind of secret pact, I'm not sure how much influence he actually has over oil prices.

So in some ways, war and attempts to get sanctions lifted — sanctions over Crimea and Russia's actions in Ukraine — were probably initially seen as better ways to strengthen the economy.

But how successful that can ultimately be is another question.

Kaius Niemi:

You're heading to Moscow after this meeting. What do you expect to see when you land in Russia economically? How long will society sustain the pain caused mainly by low oil prices, partly by sanctions, and so forth?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, it's a great question that unfortunately doesn't have a great answer.

It can last for a very long time, depending on how much Russians decide they are willing to withstand inconvenience and hardship. Russians are known to endure those things for a very long time.

On the other hand, Russians also sometimes surprise us and act very quickly.

Putin still has rather high approval ratings. I think he does need at least some sanctions removed. One of the former finance ministers recently said they expected sanctions to begin lifting by the fall — by September.

At the same time, major countries, including Canada, have imposed or prolonged sanctions for at least another half year, and in the United States I think for a year.

So I don't know what to expect. Perhaps revolution is coming tomorrow. Perhaps this will last another ten years.

But knowing Putin — not that I know him personally; I didn't look into his eyes and "see his soul," although I may have seen something there — I think we can safely say he is going to try to remain in power for as long as he can.

Solutions will therefore be incremental. He will try to make enough concessions to the population so they continue supporting him, while not stepping away from his increasingly oppressive politics, where essentially every aspect of Russian life is under Kremlin control.

And I don't think that is going to change.

On the other hand, there could be a palace coup tomorrow and he could be gone in a jiffy.

Kaius Niemi:

What role does the rising middle class play in this?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, the rising middle class played a huge role in 2010 and 2012 — and where did it go?

There were many demonstrations and opposition movements. One famous example involved long-haul truck drivers protesting taxes and regulations involving technology they could not afford.

But this segment of the population has largely been pacified. And I think that's another thing Putin does very well: he appears personally and calms these protests down, at least temporarily.

He goes to some village in the middle of Russia and says, "I'm with you. We're going to punish all these chinovniki" — the bureaucrats — "and I am the father of the nation."

And he plays this role very, very effectively in Russia. That's partly what my book The Gulag of the Russian Mind is about. Russians are very susceptible to this kind of personal attention from the tsar.

So yes, the middle class is rising. But Putin still has — maybe not 80 percent support — but certainly no less than 70 percent popularity. And at least 60 percent of those supporters are willing to endure hardship just to support the man in the Kremlin.

Because, as the Russian saying goes: "Better the devil we know."

So who is better than the great Putin now?

Kaius Niemi:

It is interesting because we can see that the methods used to cement power are becoming highly sophisticated.

As everything changes, organizations benchmark new business models from each other. But unfortunately it also seems that anti-democratic forces and policymakers benchmark each other as well. New methods are being used actively to suppress press freedom and other basic human rights.

One worrying example is that the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán listed Russia, China, and Turkey a few years ago as successful nations "none of which is liberal and some of which aren't even democracies."

So how much do you think Putin's government is learning from others — and how much are others learning from Putin?

Nina Khrushcheva:

That's a great question.

Yes, I actually call this broader global trend "democratic authoritarianism." In these systems, elections still happen and there are democratic institutions on paper, but real power remains authoritarian and democratic institutions are gradually hollowed out.

I think Galina Timchenko of Meduza — which we follow religiously because there are fewer and fewer outlets that tell real stories — spoke very well about this yesterday. She described how the circle keeps getting tighter and tighter.

Putin became an example for many of these leaders because he came to power in 2000. Everybody else was still in diapers, politically speaking.

He has now been in power for sixteen, almost seventeen years. Another year and he would match Leonid Brezhnev, who seemed to rule the Soviet Union forever.

So yes, Putin became an important model.

And interestingly, Putin himself once said that he took cues from Dick Cheney, the U.S. vice president from 2000 to 2008 — basically saying: "If you don't need to be democratic, then I don't need to be democratic either."

But jokes aside, this is actually a very dangerous trend.

You no longer need to be a fully totalitarian leader like Bashar al-Assad. You can instead be Erdogan, Putin, Orbán, or Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland — who, by the way, hates Putin but often behaves similarly politically.

These leaders create systems that formally look democratic while functioning in deeply non-democratic ways.

And I think if we are looking for the next major story for journalism to investigate, this is exactly what we should pay close attention to.

Kaius Niemi:

Well, we certainly have to work on that.

From the European perspective, what should be done in order to become a force that Putin would actually take seriously? Right now it seems that Putin is establishing bilateral relationships within Europe, while the European Union's own foreign policy is being diluted — especially after Crimea and the war in Ukraine.

So what would your solution be for the European Union in dealing with Putin?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, unfortunately I think the European Union may already have missed an important opportunity.

Yes, sanctions were imposed collectively by the European Union, but Europe was by no means truly speaking with one voice — even if it claimed to be. Because on the one hand there were sanctions, but on the other hand Putin continued meeting individually with leaders such as the Finnish president, the Austrian president, the Italian prime minister, and others.

So he understands very well that the European Union is deeply fractured. Even if sanctions formally exist, Europe remains internally divided.

You have countries like the Czech Republic questioning sanctions altogether.

I think Europe needs to speak with one voice. But whether that is actually possible when you have nearly thirty countries in a union is another question. Can they truly act according to the same interests?

And I think politicians like Kaczyński or Orbán further undermine the European Union's common message.

So I think unity is what would be needed — but I wonder whether that opportunity has already partly passed.

Kaius Niemi:

You mentioned Meduza, which you said you follow religiously. What media outlets and news brands do you actually follow when trying to understand Russia today? And how worried are you about press freedom in Russia?

Because obviously there are serious problems.

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, everybody worries about press freedom in Russia, and people have worried about it for more than a decade now.

Major television networks like NTV were taken over by the state long ago.

Yesterday there was a lot of discussion about journalistic self-censorship. In Russia it is pervasive. Journalists know that if they write certain things, they may lose their jobs.

Galina Timchenko spoke yesterday about Lenta.ru being effectively shut down, and RIA Novosti being transformed into something entirely different.

There are still a few remaining outlets. Putin is a very clever man, and because of that there is a tendency — and I'm guilty of this too, though I always stress that I'm not directly equating Stalin and Putin — to compare them.

Some comparisons are valid because both sought to govern Russia autocratically and unilaterally.

But Stalin's oppression targeted everything and everyone completely, and eventually the whole system exploded.

What Putin has done during these sixteen years is different: he never fully seals the pressure cooker. He leaves a few openings.

So steam can escape, and people can still believe there is some freedom. There is Dozhd TV, where people can still speak relatively freely. There is Echo of Moscow, where alternative versions of stories can still be heard. There is The New Times, which still offers criticism.

And all of that is true.

But these remaining outlets exist under constant surveillance. One step too far, and something can happen to them.

And they also do not reach most Russians. The majority — perhaps 70 or 80 percent — still receive their news primarily from state television and Kremlin-controlled channels.

The internet is increasingly under surveillance as well.

So if Putin remains in power — as he says, "as long as the Constitution permits," until 2024 — one can imagine what may happen during those additional years.

And I would not expect much good from it.

Kaius Niemi:

This would be a good moment to open the discussion to questions from the audience. Please introduce yourself and ask your question.

Audience Member (Johannes Hahn, ZDF):

Hello, I'm Johannes Hahn from German television ZDF.

I would like to ask what kind of game you think Putin is currently playing within Europe. There are many rumors that Russia is trying to destabilize governments by spreading stories and rumors — for example involving incidents concerning German-Russian citizens. NATO has already spoken about propaganda campaigns directed at Germany.

Do you think this could be true?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Oh, I absolutely think it could be true.

Not to be too trivial about it, but Putin was a KGB officer. Former KGB officer — though perhaps once KGB, always KGB.

So yes, absolutely. This is how influence operations work: through information campaigns, planting stories, and exploiting divisions.

And I think to some extent Putin is very satisfied that he has managed to split parts of Europe against other parts of Europe.

And in fact some people even predicted — I wasn't one of them — some people predicted rather cleverly that one of the bases for the Crimea annexation and the further actions in Ukraine was also to break relationships within Europe, but also between Europe and the United States.

Because of course the United States was very adamant originally about sanctions, while Europe was less so.

So propaganda is certainly there. And everybody watches Russia Today, I'm sure, or at least knows of that great propaganda outlet that the Kremlin put together quite successfully.

One of the things I think is important — I had debates with my colleagues in America. They always say, "Well, we have to discredit Putin's propaganda."

No, it's not possible. Because you can only spend so much time discrediting propaganda. You would have to spend 24/7 on every outlet talking only about this.

I think the important thing is simply to tell the story. And something we heard so eloquently earlier about reporting from war zones — to tell the story, to tell the story, to tell the story.

And that's how, not necessarily in Russia but certainly outside Russia, the truth can still be heard.

Kaius Niemi:

There is a hand raising nearby. Yes please, Galina.

Galina Sidorova (Foundation for Investigative Journalism, Russia):

Putin seems to be enjoying his role as a planetary bad guy. And we also see, especially in recent years, that he is rushing from one adventure to another: aggression against Ukraine, Crimea, and now the Syrian adventure.

Do you perceive this as a strategy? Can we call it a special strategy of Putin? And do you perceive him in the long run as a loser or as a winner?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, I'm sure, Galina, you can answer this question better than I can.

Yes, he's a gambler. He's clearly a very adventurous political gambler.

He enjoys shocking the world. I think he's a great exhibitionist. I think he has a slight Napoleonic complex, and with this comes many exhibitionist tendencies that emerge politically.

I think it's not in vain that he practices judo.

The big question is always: what is his big game? What is his endgame?

Well, the endgame is simple. He needs to stay in power. Because if he loses power, getting out of power is not going to be nice and peaceful.

He helped create a system of governance that treats its enemies very violently. So if he himself becomes an enemy of that system, we can only imagine what may happen to him.

So he needs to stay in power. And his larger endgame, as I said earlier, is to bring Russia back to the great-power table.

There is a big debate over whether he is a good strategist or not. Strategically, I think Russia is a loser, period.

When everything settles down, what does Russia really have to show for it? A failing economy, collapsing infrastructure, and relationships with the world based largely on fear — which is not a sustainable basis for the future.

But tactically, I think he is brilliant. He is a brilliant tactician.

He figured out that these splinter tactics, these judo-like maneuvers, really work for him.

He only needs to last another ten, fifteen, maybe twenty years.

And then, perhaps, Russia will once again have to pick itself up and rebuild itself from the beginning.

One thing we know from history is that many grand Russian achievements — even Stalin's industrialization — eventually become obsolete because they are not based on systemic institutional development that can sustain the future.

Stalin's industrialization became obsolete within thirty years.

And I think something similar may happen with Putin's system.

But for now, tactically, he is certainly a winner.

The question is simply for how long this can continue.

And also what kinds of decisions the world — and other great powers — make in order to preempt his actions instead of being surprised every time he suddenly does something, such as announcing: "Oh, I'm leaving Syria."

That is the real challenge. And it's not only a Russian question — it's a question for the entire world.

Kaius Niemi:

Then one more question — we still have time for one.

Audience Member:

My name is Monika G. I come from the internet website Delfi in Lithuania, in the Baltics.

I wanted to ask your prognosis regarding the behavior of Russian society. You mentioned that it can withstand a bad situation for a long time and then suddenly act very quickly.

It seems that Putin's ratings are very high, and that this support is in some sense genuine, not simply fabricated. People somehow seem to believe in him.

So what is your prognosis for how long this is going to last?

Nina Khrushcheva:

Well, I don't know. We actually had this question earlier and I said I cannot answer it.

I do not know how long this can last.

As I said, it can last for a long time — or it may not last for a long time.

But being from Lithuania, you probably know us very well. Once again, you could perhaps answer this question better than I can.

Russia does rely on power from the top. Russians rely on power from the top.

And in my book I wrote rather unfavorably about us, saying that we don't even need barbed wire to keep us in check — we build it inside our own minds.

It's a complicated question.

Russia is a huge country — eleven time zones — and a country of that size functions very differently from a small country.

There are very few examples left in the world of countries of this size, especially countries stretching from borders with Germany or Finland all the way to borders with Japan.

That explains a lot about Russian mentality.

For now, I really do not see the population giving up.

Because I think the question "If not Putin, then who?" remains very important for Russians.

It's not necessarily that everybody believes in him completely. But they do not see anyone else who could come in and help the situation.

My hope is for a palace coup — but once again, who knows?

Although I do think that many people around Putin wake up every morning asking themselves: "What the hell has happened to us?"

"Why can't we travel?"

One good example is Sergey Ivanov, who was deputy prime minister — also a KGB man, also a military man — and very good friends with Donald Rumsfeld, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense.

He would really like to go to Wyoming to visit Donald Rumsfeld, or to New Mexico, but he can't. And he's reportedly very upset about that.

So yes, a palace coup is one possibility.

But once again, that could take a very long time.

Or perhaps the next time the ruble drops to 120 rubles per dollar, revolution happens the very same day.

I'm sorry to leave you with such an ambiguous answer, but that's honestly all I have.

Kaius Niemi:

The palace coup is of course a very interesting option. But then what next?

My last question would be: who would be the next guy? And how could things evolve? Because it's also possible that the next person would not actually be any better than Putin himself.

Nina Khrushcheva:

Yes, that's entirely possible.

A lot of people in the system are statists. A lot of them are imperial-minded, because Russia continues in many ways to function as an imperial power.

On the other hand, historically Russia has always had pendulum swings — from reforms to dictatorship, though of course Russia never really had full democracy.

And look: when Stalin died, Nikita Khrushchev was the last person anyone would have imagined replacing him. Stalin himself would probably have thought that was the biggest joke in the world.

When Gorbachev came to power, he was initially viewed as a KGB-backed candidate who would continue the existing formula.

So you really never know.

Some of the non-reformers we see today who might replace Putin could unexpectedly turn into people at least willing to entertain the idea that Russia should be part of the world community instead of existing permanently in opposition to it.

Kaius Niemi:

We have to thank Nina for this very, very interesting discussion.

You have portrayed for us the present day, and also a little bit about the future — although of course it is difficult to predict, that's for sure.

But it's also important to remember what you said at the beginning: that Putin knows history, and that it is equally important that everybody else knows history too.

That is part of the journalistic role as well — to remember what has brought us to this stage, in Russia, in Europe, in every continent, and also in the Middle East.

I just want to share something at the end by quoting Nina from her homepage, because there is something very touching there.

You write that you love countries and their cities. As a former Soviet citizen who was never supposed to leave the great communist motherland with its eleven time zones, traveling is essential to your life.

"I love flying. Even with all security issues after 9/11, I still do. And any annoyance you encounter at the home airport is nothing compared to the treasures you will find on the other side."

To me, Nina's words summarize well the importance of an open world, an open personal mind, and the need for open societies, freedom of movement, and freedom of speech.

So ladies and gentlemen, let's give a hand to Nina.

[Applause]

Nina Khrushcheva:

Thank you.